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ADMINISTRATIVE COMMENT
UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL




FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS: AN INTRODUCTION TO MEDICAL
DISCRIMINATION AGAINST PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES
The United States Commission on Civil Rights' recently released a report
which examines the practice of withholding lifesaving medical treatment
from critically ill newborns.2 The report is the result of two Commission
hearings,3 as well as staff research and contributions from outside experts.4
The report attempts "to determine the nature and extent of the practice of
withholding medical treatment or nourishment from handicapped infants
and to examine the appropriate role for the Federal Government."5 Find-
ings of the report suggest that "decisions to withhold medically indicated
treatment from infants born with disabilities continue to occur despite being
prohibited by the Child Abuse Amendments of 1984." 6
The report provides a comprehensive review of this controversial and
complex issue. Among the topics discussed in the report are: 1) the physi-
1. The United States Commission on Civil Rights is independent and bipartisan. It was
initially established by Congress in 1957 and reestablished in 1983. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1975 et. seq.
(Supp. 1989). The responsibilities of the Commission include studying and compiling informa-
tion concerning discrimination, investigating complaints of discrimination, and reviewing fed-
eral laws and policies regarding discrimination. The Commission's reports and
recommendations are submitted to Congress and the President. Past and present members of
the Commission responsible for the report include: William B. Allen, Chairman, Murray
Friedman, Vice Chairman, Mary Frances Berry, Esther G. Buckley, Sherwin T.S. Chan, Rob-
ert A. Destro, Francis S. Guess, and Blandina Cardenas Ramirez.
2. UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, MEDICAL DISCRIMINATION
AGAINST CHILDREN WITH DISABILITIES 1 (Sept. 1989) [hereinafter MEDICAL
DISCRIMINATION].
3. The hearings were held in Washington, D.C. on June 12-14, 1985 and June 26-27,
1986.
4. MEDICAL DISCRIMINATION, supra note 2, at 1.
5. Id.
6. Id. at iii.
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cian-parent relationship and its effect on decisionmaking;7 2) quality of life
assessments;' 3) the Rehabilitation Act of 1973;9 4) the Child Abuse
Amendments of 1984; ° 5) constitutional issues;1 6) Child Protection Serv-
ices and the enforcement of the Child Abuse Amendments;' 2 7) role of in-
fant care review committees.' 3  The report concludes with several
recommendations, including one urging the executive branch to consider the
resumption of investigations into allegations of medical nontreatment and a
concomitant enforcement of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. 14 This
Administrative Note is not a replacement for reading the detailed report
itself, but is merely a review of its major findings, recommendations, and
political viewpoints.
Federal attention became focused on this issue as a result of the "Baby
Doe" case.' 5 On April 9, 1982, an infant afflicted with Down syndrome was
born in a Bloomington, Indiana hospital.' 6 The child, who became known
as Baby Doe, suffered from a blockage of the esophagus and needed correc-
tive surgery so food would reach the stomach.'" The parents consulted with
their obstetrician, who emphasized that even if the child survived surgery, a
"normal" life would not be possible.'" The obstetrician advised the parents
that they could choose not to act, in which case, the child would probably
only survive a few days."' After the consultation, Baby Doe's parents re-
fused to consent to the surgery and the infant died six days later.2"
The Baby Doe case highlights a common, but frightening, attitude that is
prevalent in our society. Traditionally, disabled individuals have been
viewed as a menace, incapable of self-support, and a burden on society.2 '
Armed with this mindset, one noted authority on child abuse and neglect
urges that a state should intervene to save the life of a child only when the
child would have a "life worth living or a life of relatively normal healthy
7. Id. at 2-3, 26-31.
8. Id. at 3-4, 32-47.
9. Id. at 5-7, 61-77.
10. Id. at 7-8, 79-82.
11. Id. at 8, 93-101.
12. Id. at 8-9, 111-17.
13. Id. at 9-10, 118-29.
14. Id. at 151.
15. Id. at 21-22 and accompanying notes.
16. Id. at 21.
17. Id. at 21 n.17.
18. Id. at 21.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 21-22.
21. Id. at 23-25.
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growth."2 2 The report makes clear that the complex issue of whether or not
to treat disabled children must be approached "with sensitivity to the effect
of this background of dehumanizing attitudes concerning people with
disabilities."23
PHYSICIAN-PARENT RELATIONSHIPS AND TREATMENT/NONTREATMENT
DECISIONMAKING
The birth of a disabled infant is a strenuous and emotional time for par-
ents. In shock and ill-informed about their child's disability, parents turn to
their physician(s) to determine what treatment, if any, should be provided
for their child.24 The influence of medical personnel is great, with physi-
cians typically taking the first step by approaching parents with a recom-
mendation regarding treatment.2 5
If parents have had no interaction with other disabled persons, their
thoughts and emotions might reflect the "stigmatization of people with disa-
bilities to which they have been persuasively and sometimes subconsciously
subjected for most of their lives." 26 This preconceived notion of their child's
condition may not be grounded in fact. Moreover, there is often misinfor-
mation among physicians regarding advances and alternatives for children
with disabilities and unclear communication between physicians and par-
ents. 27 These problems raise the question of whether a parent's decision not
22. Id. at 25 n.7.
23. Id. at 25.
24. Id. at 26-27.
25. Id. at 27-30. "There seems to be near unanimity, from health care personnel who
support as well as those who oppose denial of treatment, that in all but a handful of cases the
manner and content of the medical provider's presentation of the issue will be decisive in
determining the parental 'decision.' " Id. at 29.
26. Id. at 32-33.
27. Id. at 30-31. For example, one special education professor testified that health care
personnel and bioethicists do not have the latest information about progress made in rehabili-
tative services. "Regrettably, reports of the advances in special education, habilitation and
rehabilitation have not yet received wide dissemination in either the popular media or the
literature of other professions. . ... " Id. at 30 (quoting Protection of Handicapped Newborns:
Hearing Before the United States Commission on Civil Rights 97 (1986)(vol.II) (testimony of
Professor Ruth Luckasson, Department of Special Education, University of New Mexico).
According to the Task Force on Technology-Dependent Children, this lack of communica-
tion may continue if the child survives.
Professionals have traditionally controlled the delivery of services with little or no
input from the parents. In this environment, parents have often felt disenfranchised
and incapable of influencing their child's care.... Some parents are influencing how,
when and where services are provided .... For other parents, relationships with
professionals may be less than supportive, as these parents often lack the confidence
to assume a prominent role and/or may be excluded from care decisions by profes-
sionals. This lack of parental involvement in the decision-making process may result
1990]
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to allow treatment is based on informed consent.28
Based on the evidence presented, the Commission concludes that treat-
ment decisions are influenced by information given to the parents by their
doctors. The Commission goes further to state that "doctors are often the
prime movers in denying the treatment. ' 29
ROLE OF QUALITY OF LIFE ASSESSMENTS IN DENIAL
OF MEDICAL TREATMENT
The justification often given for denying disabled children treatment is
that "it is in the children's best interests to spare them a life of unacceptably
poor quality."3° This assumption does not appear to be shared by disabled
individuals. 3 The report suggests that society's discrimination against dis-
abled individuals is more harmful to them than their physical limitations,32
supported by extensive testimony that disabled persons are capable of lead-
ing full and rich lives when barriers to their full integration are removed.33
The past two decades have seen tremendous gains in the quality of life possi-
in programs of care for the child that are unrealistic and unachievable.... Some of
the resistance by professionals to include parents in the decision-making process may
be a result of their lack of knowledge and experience in working within a collabora-
tive process, and the non-reimbursed time that this requires in institutions that are
increasingly concerned with funding issues. Still others may question the validity
and objectivity of parents in meeting this responsibility.
U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, HEALTH CARE FINANCING ADMINISTRA-
TION, 2 REPORT TO CONGRESS AND THE SECRETARY BY THE TASK FORCE ON TECHNOL-
OGY-DEPENDENT CHILDREN 47 (Apr. 1988) [hereinafter TASK FORCE ON TECHNOLOGY-
DEPENDENT CHILDREN].
28. MEDICAL DISCRIMINATION, supra note 2, at 30-31.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 32.
31. Id. at 32-33.
32. Id. It is interesting to note a distinction that two Canadian commentators have made.
Special mention should be made of mental retardation. Properly speaking, mental
retardation is a medical factor. Nevertheless, retardation is such an important con-
sideration in doctors' minds that it transcends the purely medical. There is wide-
spread discomfort and fear provoked in many doctors, paramedical staff, and parents
by retardation. Even a mildly handicapping situation can become ripe for a decision
not to treat if retardation is a factor.
J. MAGNET & E. KLUGE, WITHHOLDING TREATMENT FROM DEFECTIVE NEWBORN CHIL-
DREN 24 (1985) (footnotes omitted) [hereinafter WITHHOLDING TREATMENT]. These Cana-
dian commentators, however, governmental intervention as interference and support a more
autonomous role for decision-makers. Id. at 244-51.
33. MEDICAL DISCRIMINATION, supra note 2, at 34. One professor who testified obtained
copies of letters written by parents and relatives of disabled individuals and sent to the Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services. Id. at 43; Appendix B, at 229. These letters contained
comments on the 1983 proposed regulations promulgated under section 504. Aside from re-
vealing overwhelming support of the regulations, "thirty-five percent of the respondents identi-
fied at least one positive contribution that the person with a disability had made to others." Id.
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ble for disabled individuals. Medical progress, the improved special educa-
tion programs developed subsequent to the passage of major legislation,34
increased support for parents, technological advances, and the deinstitution-
alization and mainstreaming of individuals into the community have all
greatly enhanced the quality of life possible for disabled individuals.35
The ability of disabled individuals to lead full lives is evidence that the
bleak prognosis made at the time of birth is often proven false. The Com-
mission cites several examples, 36 most notably the case of Baby Jane Doe in
New York.37 Baby Jane Doe was born with spina bifida and fluid on her
abnormally small brain, and her parents were given little hope by doctors. 38
While the parents' original decision to forego treatment was upheld in court,
they changed their minds and allowed surgery. 39 As of 1987, Baby Jane,
now known as Keri-Lynn, was talking, using a wheelchair, and going to
school.4 '
Addressing the question of why many negative prognoses never material-
ize, the Commission states that:
Considerable evidence points to a significant tendency among
health care providers to underestimate the capacities of children
with disabilities and erroneously to convey unduly pessimistic
prognoses to parents about their projected quality of life.41
Studies cited by the Commission reveal a tendency on the part of physicians
to give negative prognoses.42 One explanation offered is that doctors usually
at 229. In addition, thirty percent of the respondents addressed "[a] loss of confidence in the
medical profession" and nine percent recognized "inaccurate medical prediction." Id. at 230.
34. Education of the Handicapped Act, 20 U.S.C.A. § 1400 et. seq. (1978 & Supp. 1990).
35. MEDICAL DISCRIMINATION, supra note 2, at 34-35.
36. Id. at 39-42. Reports have also indicated that "individuals with Down syndrome can
indeed learn to read, to communicate, and to interact positively with others, activities that
contribute to the development of independence." Id. at 37. With early intervention and spe-
cial education, a child with Down syndrome can become, as an adult, a successful employee.
Id. at 37-39.
37. Id. at 39-41.
38. Id. One doctor stated that "the baby is so severely deformed that there is nothing that
can be done." Id. (quoting Dr. Henry Jennison, Director of the American Academy of Pedi-
atrics, in Pro and Con[] Should Uncle Sam Protect Handicapped Babies? U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., Jan. 16, 1984, at 63, 64). Another doctor who testified in court, said that the
"malformations" of Baby Jane Doe were such that she "is not likely to ever achieve any mean-
ingful interaction with her environment, nor ever achieve any interpersonal relationships." Id.
(quoting Dr. George Newman, in Baringer, Meese Approved Intervention in Baby Case, Wash.
Post, Nov. 16, 1983, at A16).
39. MEDICAL DISCRIMINATION, supra note 2, at 40.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 43.
42. Id. at 43-45. One study revealed that pediatricians perceived mentally retarded indi-
viduals to be "devoid of most human capabilities, including the ability to sustain friendships;
1990]
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see these children when they are ill and in need of attention; not when they
are at their best.4 3 On the other hand, "[tihose who have contact with peo-
ple with disabilities on a more regular basis, when they are not in an immedi-
ate medical crisis-such as their teachers, coworkers, and family members-
tend to have much more positive views of their abilities."'
How appropriate is the use of the quality of life assessments in making
life-saving treatment decisions? The scope of quality of life assessments is
not limited merely to the quality of life for the disabled individual, but is also
imputed to the person's family or society in general.4" "In other words, the
burden the person creates for others outweighs the benefits they experience
because she or he exists.",46
In determining the appropriateness of quality of life assessments, the
Commission makes an important distinction between "technical medical
judgments" regarding the likelihood of a treatment's success and judgments
about whether or not the treatment should be used on a particular person.
"The first sort of judgment is one that is uniquely medical in nature. The
second sort of judgment is not, properly speaking, a 'medical' one. It is a
social judgment about the value or desirability of particular people's lives.",47
Advocates of disability rights view the consideration of burdens placed on
family or society by the disabled person as discrimination.4" The Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services (HHS), in its implementation of the
Child Abuse Amendments of 1984, holds the view that the consideration of
subjective statements regarding the quality of life are impermissible for the
pediatricians believed they were unlikely to work in any setting or reside outside an institu-
tional setting." Id. at 43 (quoting Wolraich, Siperstein & O'Keefe, Pediatricians' Perceptions of
Mentally Retarded Individuals, 80 PEDIATRICS 643, 647 (1987)).
43. Id. at 44.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 45. Canadian commentators gathered data on such quality of life assessments.
Certain doctors try to appraise the effect which addition of a deformed child would
have on the particular family. These doctors know that parents of handicapped chil-
dren experience high divorce rates; feel much guilt; and express mutual recrimina-
tions. Strain is produced on the family by uncertainty and long periods of
hospitalization. Other children frequently react adversely. A neonatologist pointed
out that it is senseless to ruin five people's lives in order to save a life of questionable
* quality.... Social welfare considerations are important. A minority of doctors sur-
veyed have a heightened awareness of the economic burdens handicapped children
impose on society. This perception creates a greater overall resistance to treatment.
WITHHOLDING TREATMENT, supra note 32, at 22-23 (footnotes omitted).
46. MEDICAL DISCRIMINATION, supra note 2, at 45. Testimony cited in the Commis-
sion's report suggested that the initial negative attitude of parents toward their disabled child
changes as interaction increases. Id. at 45-46.
47. Id. at 46.
48. Id.
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purpose of making life-saving treatment decisions.49 The Commission con-
cludes that quality of life arguments "are often grounded in misinformation,
inaccurate stereotypes, and negative attitudes about people with disabili-
ties."50 Therefore, commitment to civil rights includes a commitment to the
people with disabilities and their families, not by elimination, but through
support, acceptance, and "defending their rights to accessible and integrated
transportation, housing, education, health care, and employment."5 1
THE ROLE OF ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS IN DENIALS
OF MEDICAL TREATMENT
As stated previously, many view the costs associated with caring for the
disabled as too great to be borne by society.5 2 Since society has limited re-
sources, why not spend the money on "normal" children?53 Often, the cost
of care is factored into the treatment decision. How one undertakes such a
cost-benefit analysis varies, but the Commission views this analysis as
discrimination:
Cost-benefit analysis as a justification for denial of treatment to
people with disabilities implies discrimination based on disability,
because such evaluations are not typically employed in other con-
texts. The Commission emphatically rejects the view that life-sav-
ing medical services should be provided or denied to any group of
people based on their estimated economic worth to society.54
It is generally believed that, the more disabled the child, the greater the
cost of the care and the less likely the child will develop into a productive
adult. This belief, however, can be a self-fulfilling prophecy. Institutional-
ization for the disabled individual with a concomitant limitation on the
child's ability to become self-sufficient may be the result of this belief.55 The
49. Id. at 47.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 48. Canadian commentators noted:
The economic position of the baby's family figures prominently in medical decision-
making. Most doctors think that if the parents are well situated financially, it is
more likely that they will be able to cope with a handicapped child. Consequently, in
questionable cases, the child of economically comfortable parents has greater chances
of receiving treatment.
WITHHOLDING TREATMENT, supra note 32, at 23.
53. MEDICAL DISCRIMINATION, supra note 2, at 48. Cf Timothy W. v. Rochester, New
Hampshire School District, 875 F.2d 954 (lst Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 519 (1989) (holding
that school districts must provide education to all handicapped children regardless of the se-
verity of the handicap).
54. MEDICAL DISCRIMINATION, supra note 2, at 49 (footnote omitted).
55. Id. at 55. Recognizing that a disability does require cost, the Commission noted:
The assumption has been that the level of severity of disability is the major determi-
1990]
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Commission cites studies which show that the cost of residential services
varied more by the setting than the needs of the client,5 6 that a trend has
developed toward family style placements which are less costly, 7 and that
job training programs are increasing the productivity of severely and pro-
foundly disabled individuals. 8
In spite of the cost advantages of group and family home living arrange-
ments, federal and state policies do not encourage such programs.59 The
nant of lifetime costs.... Although this assumption is unfounded, it has resulted in a
self-fulfilling prophecy: a diagnosis of severe disability leads to placement of a person
in an institutional and non-work environment that significantly limits that person's
capability and entails far more expense than necessary.
Id.
56. Id. (citing ASBAUGH & NERNEY, AN ANALYSIS OF THE COSTS OF SERVING PERSONS
WITH MENTAL RETARDATION BY TYPE OF RESIDENTIAL ARRANGEMENT: MACOMB-OAK-
LAND REGION IN MICHIGAN, REGION V IN NEBRASKA, AND REGION V IN NEW HAMPSHIRE
14 (1988)).
57. Id. at 52 (citing interview with Thomas Nerney, coauthor and project coordinator for
ASBAUGH & NERNEY study, supra note 56 (Nov. 29, 1988)).
The Task Force on Technology-Dependent Children stated:
Recent studies indicate that, for pediatric technology-dependent populations, a com-
munity-based care is generally cost-effective, as compared with hospital care....
Programs as diverse as a Medicaid model waiver program in Maryland; and commu-
nity ventilator care program managed by Kaiser Permanente in Southern California;
CHAMPUS' two-year home health care demonstration project; and Blue Cross-Blue
Shield's individual benefits management program under its Federal Employee Pro-
gram, have all reported substantial cost savings in community-based services for
technology-dependent individuals as compared to hospital care. In some instances,
savings in these programs have run as high as 50 percent.
TASK FORCE ON TECHNOLOGY-DEPENDENT CHILDREN, supra note 27, at 66.
58. MEDICAL DISCRIMINATION, supra note 2, at 53-55.
59. Id. at 52. One government group has examined ways to assist in reducing the barriers
to home and community-based care for technology-dependent children. The Task Force for
Technology-Dependent Children defines these children between the ages of birth to twenty-one
with a chronic disability that requires the "routine use of a specific medical device to compen-
sate for the loss of life sustaining body function." In addition, they require "daily, ongoing
care or monitoring by trained personnel." TASK FORCE ON TECHNOLOGY-DEPENDENT CHIL-
DREN, supra note 27, at vii-1.
Authorized by section 9520 of the Consolidated Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1985, P.L.
99-272, the Task Force analyzed "barriers that prevent the provision of appropriate care in a
home or community setting to meet the special needs of technology-dependent children." Id.
It also "recommend[ed] changes in the provision and financing of health care in private and
public health care programs, including appropriate public-private initiatives, in order to pro-
vide home and community-based alternatives to the institutionalization of children." Id.
The report outlined three approaches for the provision and payment of services to technol-
ogy-dependent children. Id. The first approach would utilize existing public and private
health insurance provisions and suggest the "financing [of] selected incremental policy
changes." Id. at vii-3-vii-4. In the second approach, "each State Medicaid agency ... would
arrange for the delivery by qualified systems of excellence of pre-authorized medical, develop-
mental, and support services specified in the individual care plan for a child certified as tech-
nology-dependent." Id. at vii-4. The third approach would utilize a "public-private
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Commission recommends that changes be made in Medicaid in order to pro-
vide funding to family and group homes." If incentives are provided for use
of such living situations, the alleged "cost" of a disability will drop
significantly.6 1
REHABILITATION ACT OF 1973
At the time of the Baby Doe case, no federal law expressly prohibited
withholding of medical treatment from critically ill infants. President Rea-
gan, however, directed the Department of Health and Human Services to
take administrative action on behalf of handicapped infants who had been
denied medical treatment.62 Initially, HHS gave notice to health care prov-
iders that Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act63 was applicable to the
withholding of medical treatment from disabled infants. The Secretary of
Health and Human Services issued an interim final rule on March 7, 1983.
64
The rule established procedures for enforcement of section 504, requiring
hospitals to post a notice that failure to feed and care for handicapped in-
fants was a violation of federal law.6 5 The rule also established a toll free
"hotline" number which would receive reports of infants being discriminato-
rily denied care and authorized federal investigators twenty-four hour access
to the infant's records.66
The rule was immediately challenged by hospitals and medical groups. In
American Academy of Pediatrics v. Heckler,67 the court invalidated the rule
on the grounds that it should have been published for public comment.68
In July 1983, HHS published a new "proposed" rule, essentially the same
as the old one. 69 HHS conducted negotiations with the American Academy
consortium-administered financing" program for those children without benefits or whose ben-
efits under a program have been exceeded. Id. at vii-5.
While not "endorsing cost-free access to publicly subsidized care for all technology-depen-
dent children," the Task Force states that the goal of any plan should be "universal access to
family-centered, coordinated, community-based care, regardless of economic status, or physi-
cal condition." Id. at vii-2.
60. MEDICAL DISCRIMINATION, supra note 2, at 53.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 63.
63. This section states in part that "no otherwise qualified individual ... shall, solely by
reason of his handicap, be excluded from participation in, be denied benefit of, or be subjected
to discrimination under any program or activity receiving federal financial assistance." 29
U.S.C. § 794 (1983).
64. 48 Fed. Reg. 9,630 (1983).
65. 48 Fed. Reg. 9,630-9,631 (1983).
66. Id.
67. 561 F. Supp. 395 (D.D.C. 1983).
68. Id. at 400-01.
69. 48 Fed. Reg. 30,846 (1983).
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of Pediatricians (AAP) in exchange for the AAP's agreement not to sue over
the Final Rule.7°
The Final Rule, published on January 12, 1984,71 provided model guide-
lines for the establishment of infant care review committees. 72 The Final
Rule redrafted the informational notice required to be posted and provided
two alternative notices.73 Child Protective Services (CPS) agencies were re-
quired to implement reporting procedures for immediate review of reports,
investigation, and the provision of protection where necessary. 74 The CPS
agencies were also required to notify HHS of these reports. 75 HHS could
have immediate access to records when it judged such access necessary to
protect life or health.76
Again, the rule was challenged.77 The Supreme Court's plurality decision
in Bowen v. American Hospital Association 78 invalidated the Final Rules.
Justice Stevens stated: "A hospital's withholding of treatment when no pa-
rental consent has been given cannot violate section 504, for without the
consent of the parents or a surrogate decisionmaker the infant is neither
'otherwise qualified' for treatment nor has he been denied care 'solely by
reason of his handicap.' ,,7 The Commission noted that this statement
sparked its analysis of the parent-physician relationship.80
Justice Stevens also based his opinion on the lack of sufficient evidence in
70. MEDICAL DISCRIMINATION, supra note 2, at 70.
71. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Handicap; Procedures and Guidelines Relating to
Health Care for Handicapped Infants, 49 Fed. Reg. 1,622 (1984).
72. MEDICAL DISCRIMINATION, supra note 2, at 70 (citing Nondiscrimination on the Ba-
sis of Handicap; Procedures and Guidelines Relating to Health Care for Handicapped Infants,
49 Fed. Reg. 1,622, 1,651 (1984)).
73. Id. at 71.
74. Id. at 71 (citing 45 C.F.R. § 84.55 (c)(l)(i), (ii), (iii), (iv) (1987)).
75. Id. at 71 (citing 45 C.F.R. § 84.55 (c)(l)(v) (1987)).
76. Id. at 71 (citing 45 C.F.R. § 84.55 (d) (1987)).
77. United States v. University Hosp., 729 F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 1984). The Second Circuit
addressed the validity of the Final Rule in the context of the Baby Jane Doe case. The court
perceived the requirements of the Final Rule as inapplicable to such complicated medical deci-
sions and held that the reach of section 504 did not extend to the investigations required under
the Final Rule. MEDICAL DISCRIMINATION, supra note 2, at 72-73 (citing University Hosp.,
729 F.2d at 156-61).
78. 476 U.S. 610 (1986). This case was the consolidation of an existing complaint
amended by the American Hospital Association and a separate suit by the American Medical
Association. Prior to the Supreme Court decision, the district court had concluded that the
rules were issued without statutory authority and prohibited HHS from regulating treatment
decisions under section 504. American Hosp. Ass'n v. Heckler, 585 F. Supp. 541, 542
(S.D.N.Y.), aff'd without opnion, 794 F.2d 674 (2d Cir. 1984). MEDICAL DISCRIMINATION,
supra note 2, at 73-74.
79. Id. at 74; Bowen, 476 U.S. at 630.
80. MEDICAL DISCRIMINATION, supra note 2, at 74.
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the administrative record to support regulation.81 The Commission inter-
prets the opinion:
The plurality opinion leaves a puzzling gap between the logic of its
-analysis and the apparent breadth of the plurality's description of
the Court's injunction. Nothing in Justice Stevens' analysis sug-
gests that HHS should be prevented from investigating instances in
which it is alleged that a recipient of Federal financial assistance is
failing to report medical neglect solely because the victim has a
disability, only that HHS had provided insufficient evidence of the
prevalence of discriminatory nonreporting to provide an adminis-
trative justification for the Final Rule.82
The Commission claims that section 504 can provide enforcement advan-
tages "not present in the Child Abuse Amendments alone."8" It maintains
that its hearings and research supply the information that the Supreme
Court claims was lacking in the administrative record leading to Bowen. 8'
The Commission recommends, in a way it perceives will not violate the
Bowen decision, "that the Executive branch give careful consideration to re-
suming investigation of allegations that children with disabilities are dis-
criminatorily denied medical treatment based on handicap and initiate
enforcement of section 504 in cases in which the allegations are found to be
justified."85
THE CHILD ABUSE AMENDMENTS OF 1984
After debate and negotiation which lasted over two years, 6 the Child
Abuse Amendments of 198487 were signed into law on October 9, 1984.88
This legislation allowed HHS to develop regulations and model guidelines
for infant care review committees. 89 The model guidelines regarding com-
mittee formation were intended to be voluntary and the amendments became
effective on October 9, 1985.90
81. Id. at 74-76 (citing Bowen, 476 U.S. at 626).
82. Id. at 76 (footnote omitted).
83. Id. at 77.
84. Id. at 78.
85. Id. at 78 & n.141.
86. See id. at 79-81.
87. Pub. L. No. 98-457, tit.1, §§ 121-128, 98 Stat. 1749, 1752-55, codified at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 5101-5103 (1983 & Supp. 1989).
88. MEDICAL DISCRIMINATION, supra note 2, at 81.
89. Id. at 82 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 5103 note (1983 and Supp. 1989)).
90. Id. at 82 (citing Child Abuse and Neglect Prevention and Treatment Program, 45
C.F.R. pt. 1430 (1987)). Forty-six states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico receive
funds under the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act and therefore, must comply with
the Child Abuse Amendments. California, Indiana, Ohio and Pennsylvania, however, did not
1990]
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As the Commission noted, a large number of children in states which do
not receive federal funds are not protected. Moreover, the minimal funding
received by most states does not provide a great financial incentive for com-
pliance with the Child Abuse Amendments. 91 Because of these concerns
and the controversy surrounding the legislation, the standard of care was
executed carefully. 92
The required standard of care may be divided for the purpose of
convenient analysis into nine elements: (1) a disabled (2) infant (3)
with a life-threatening condition (4) must always be given nutri-
tion, hydration, and medication (5) and must normally be given
the treatment most likely to correct or ameliorate the condition
(maximal treatment) (6) based upon the reasonable medical judg-
ment of the treating physician, (7) but the maximal treatment rule
is not applicable in three situations: when the child is "chronically
and irreversibly comatose," (8) when maximal treatment would be
futile in saving the child's life for long, and (9) when "provision of
such treatment would be virtually futile in terms of the survival of
the infant and the treatment itself under such circumstances would
be inhumane."" a
While the Commission discusses several other definitions,94 the terms
"nutrition, hydration, and medication" are crucial because "appropriate
amounts" of each must be supplied even if an exception to the required max-
receive these funds as of December 1988 and are not bound to implement the Child Abuse
Amendments. Id. at 82.
91. Id. at 82. Every state has a statute allowing authorities to act to protect a child who is
threatened by abuse or neglect. Id. at 56. In the forty-six states receiving federal funds for
their child abuse and neglect programs, those statutes must be used to prevent the withholding
of medical treatment from infants with life-threatening conditions in order to comply with the
Child Abuse Amendments of 1984. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 83 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 5102 (3) & § 5103 (b)(2)(K)(West Supp. 1988). The Com-
mission notes that the term "disabled" is not defined in the Amendments, its attendant regula-
tions, or the Interpretive Guidelines. It offers the definition developed by the American Bar
Association's Commission on the Mentally Disabled and the National Legal Resource Center
for Child Advocacy and Protections and based on the implementing regulations for section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973:
"Disabled infant" means an infant with a physical or mental impairment which sub-
stantially limits or hold the reasonable prospect of in the future substantially limiting
one or more major life activities. "Major life activities" include functions such as,
but not limited to, breathing, seeing, hearing, walking, caring for one's self, perform-
ing manual tasks, learning and working.
Id. at 83 (citing Nicholson, Horowitz & Parry, Model Procedures for Child Protective Service
Agencies Responding to Reports of Withholding Medically Indicated Treatment From Disabled
Infants With Life- Threatening Conditions, 10 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 220,
228 (1986)).
94. MEDICAL DISCRIMINATION, supra note 2, at 84-88.
Medical Discrimination: An Abstract
imal treatment is present.95 The Commission notes that many courts have
rejected the distinction between nourishment and treatment.96 In spite of
the courts' rejection of this distinction, -however, the Commission looks to
the intent of Congress and the HHS Interpretive Guidelines and declares
that "[i]t is difficult to contend, therefore, that under the Child Abuse
Amendments it can ever be appropriate to withhold nutrition or hydration
from a child with a disability who is capable of assimilating it."9 7 In addi-
tion, this same requirement applies to "pain-relieving and other palliative
medicine." 98
The Commission contends that the phrase "treatment most likely to be
effective in ameliorating or correcting all life-threatening conditions ... [is]
[t]he centerpiece of ... [the] standard of care." 99 The Interpretive Guide-
lines set forth the precise dimensions, which include a complete potential
treatment plan, diagnostic procedures, and palliative measures."°° "Chil-
dren covered by the law must be provided the treatment 'most likely to be
effective,' not just the level of treatment that would be provided to their
nondisabled counterparts."' 0'1
There are three exceptions to the treatment requirement: "the comatose
exception,"'" 2 "the futility exception,"' 0 3 and "the virtually futile and inhu-
mane exception."'" Under the comatose exception, maximal treatment
may be withheld (although not appropriate nutrition, hydration, and medi-
cation) when a child is "chronically and irreversibly comatose."'' 0 5
As to the second exception, the Commission recognizes that "[w]hen life
is inevitably ebbing away, and dying cannot be halted but only prolonged,
the interest in preserving life can no longer be satisfied. This exception was
designed to ensure that in such circumstances there would be no require-
ment that life-prolonging treatment be employed to eke life out for a brief
95. Id. at 85.
96. Id. at 85 & n.57.
97. Id. at 86.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 86.
100. Id. at 87 (citing 45 C.F.R. pt. 1340 App. Interpretive Guideline 7 (1987)).
101. Id. at 87.
102. Id. at 88-89.
103. Id. at 89-90.
104. Id. at 90.
105. Id. at 88 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 5102 (3)(A)(1983 & Supp. 1989)). One court has ruled
that the statute does not provide for a child in a persistent vegetative state. MEDICAL Dis-
CRIMINATION, supra note 2, at 89 (citing Transcript at 73, In re Steinhaus, No. J-86-92 (Minn.
Redwood County Ct., Fan. Div., Oct. 6, 1986); In re Steinhaus, No. J-86-92, slip. op. at 11-12
(Minn. Redwood County Ct., Juv. Div., Sept. 11, 1986), reprinted in Order in the Steinhaus
Case, 2 IssuEs L. & MED. 241, 247-48 (1986)).
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period longer."° 6 This exception is not applicable "where many years of life
will result from the provision of treatment, or where the prognosis is not for
death in the near future, but rather the more distant future."' 0 7 If one un-
treatable condition will result in death, then treatment for other life-threat-
ening conditions that could be cured is not required.'08
The third exception requires two criteria to be met. First, the provision of
treatment must be "virtually futile."'" The difference between "futile" and
"virtually futile" is found in the "degree of probability or uncertainty in
determining the futility of the treatment."" 0  Second, treatment itself must
be inhumane under the circumstances.' 1 ' Treatment is inhumane when
there exists "significant medical contraindications and/or significant pain
and suffering for the infant that clearly outweighs the very slight potential
benefit of the treatment for an infant highly unlikely to survive."''
2
After discussing the enforcement of the Child Abuse Amendments,' 13 the
Commission concludes that the Child Abuse Amendments of 1984 "set out a
detailed and, for the most part, unambiguous but nuanced standard of
care.' 14 The Commission views the Amendments as "provid[ing] strong
protection" upon adequate enforcement.'"
CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
In finding that decisions to withhold medically indicated treatment from
disabled infants still occur, the Commission raises two questions implicating
106. MEDICAL DISCRIMINATION, supra note 2, at 89.
107. Id. (quoting 45 C.F.R. pt. 1340 App. Interpretive Guidelines 5 (1987)).
108. MEDICAL DISCRIMINATION, supra note 2, at 89-90 (citations omitted).
109. Id. at 90.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. (quoting 45 C.F.R. pt. 1340 App. Interpretive Guideline 9 (1987)).
113. MEDICAL DISCRIMINATION, supra note 2, at 90-92. Under the implementing regula-
tions, the State agencies must contact health care facilities on an annual basis to ensure that
individuals have been designated as liaisons, with the authority to report suspected treatment
withholding and assist with investigations. Id. at 91 (citing 45 C.F.R. § 1340.14 (c), (d)
(1987)). In addition, state agencies must detail their access procedures for medical records in
the case of an investigation and provide for a court order when an independent medical exami-
nation is needed. Id. at 117.
The Commission views the most important aspect of the Final Rule as the provision ensur-
ing an independent medical examination in the event of suspected neglect. "Without the
assistance of a consultant qualified to make an independent evaluation of that condition, a
child protective services worker would in most cases be reduced to relying solely upon the
unconfirmed representations of the very physicians whose conduct is the subject of investiga-
tion." Id. at 91.
114. Id.
115. Id.
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the principles of federal constitutional law.116 The first is whether any con-
stitutional rights were in jeopardy; the second, whether "adequate substan-
tive and procedural safeguards (including a forum)" are available in the
event that constitutional rights are in jeopardy.' 1 7
The Commission, recognizing that "Congress retains the ability to man-
date a minimum level of additional protection which is not otherwise incon-
sistent with the Constitution," '  begins its analysis of equal protection by
examining various laws affecting disabled individuals."1 9 Next, the Commis-
sion reviews the Supreme Court's decision in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Center.120 In Cleburne Living Center, the Supreme Court prohibited
zoning which would exclude mentally retarded individuals from living in a
group home located in a neighborhood.' 2 ' While refusing to employ more
than a minimum rationality standard, the Court reviewed the "real reasons
behind the challenged unequal treatment and... analyz[d] whether the dis-
criminatory policy is actually related to a legitimate government pur-
pose."' 22 The Court found irrational fear and prejudice to be at the root of
the ordinance, as opposed to a legitimate government purpose, and invali-
dated it. 12
3
Integrating the testimony of a witness who views the lives of disabled chil-
dren as "hopeless" with the outlook of the Supreme Court as expressed in
Cleburne Living Center, the Commission contends:
Thus, when medical care decisionmaking is based on little more
than personal experience and hearsay regarding the capabilities of
problems of persons with disabilities and their families-that is, on
deeply ingrained stereotypes that relegate persons with disabilities
to a perpetually subordinate status-there can be no question that
the equal protection clause forbids government action that either
rests on such stereotypes or affirms them. 124
Analyzing the second issue, the Commission concludes that disabled in-
fants needing treatment often were not receiving procedural protection. 125
116. Id. at 93.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 95 n.l1.
119. Id. at 95 (citing Child Abuse Amendments of 1984, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5103 (Supp.
1988); Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985); Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465
U.S. 624 (1984); Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992 (1984)).
120. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
121. Id. at 450.
122. MEDICAL DISCRIMINATION, supra note 2, at 96 (citing City of Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 442-43 (1985)).
123. Id. at 96 (citing Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. at 448-50).
124. Id. at 97.
125. Id.
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Since the record supports the finding that predictions regarding the future
effects of a disability were often wrong, the Commission maintains that the
"careful and informed evaluation of each case by independent and disinter-
ested decisionmakers is required."'
12 6
The Commission emphasizes the important distinction between poli-
cymaking based on a "constitutional right to parental autonomy" and a
"common law or statutory right of parents or guardians to refuse medical
treatment."' 2 7 While a common law or statutory right addresses the "best
interests" of all concerned, "[c]onstitutional rights to privacy (autonomy),
however, operate as limits on the power of the government to make any
regulation at all regarding the subject matter."' 2 8 A decision based on con-
stitutional underpinnings places the issue out of legislative or executive juris-
diction, which "finds little, if any support in the case law."'129
The Commission concludes that the refusal to treat disabled newborns on
the basis of their disability and quality of life assessments threatens their
constitutional rights.' 3 ° "The principle of equal protection of the laws is
offended when disability is the basis of a nontreatment decision. Procedural
protection for the interests of both child and parents is often absent com-
pletely or is woefully inadequate to the task of sifting the facts."'' Since
recent Court decisions have not protected newborns with disabilities, Con-
gress and state legislatures must step in and provide the necessary
The due process clauses of the 5th and 14th amendments require, among other
things, that certain procedural protections must be provided before the government
may deprive individuals of life, liberty or property. Known as procedural due pro-
cess, the doctrine is most frequently interpreted as providing an opportunity to be
heard on the issue of fairness and lawfulness of the proposed deprivation.
Id.
126. Id. (footnote omitted) (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)). The
Commission recognizes that a significant constitutional issue does not arise where there is a
"medically defensible difference of opinion" regarding the treatment in question. Id. at 99.
Rather, the issue arises where there is misinformation about the disability or prejudices about
the disabled child's quality of life. Id. (footnote omitted).
127. Id. at 99.
128. Id. at 99-100 (footnote omitted). What role does privacy play in decisions to refuse
medical treatment? The Commission distinguishes between two types of privacy: "(1) the
inviolability of one's person, home, or things from unreasonable governmental intrusions; and
(2) individual autonomy or liberty with respect to certain matters important to one's person or
the course of one's life (e.g., marriage, sex, childbearing)." Id. at 98 (citing Whalen v. Roe,
429 U.S. 589 (1977)). Parents have the constitutional right to make decisions regarding how to
rear their children, but the government can step in when a child becomes endangered by those
decisions. MEDICAL DISCRIMINATION, supra note 2, at 98.
129. Id. at 100 (citing Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52
(1976); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944)).
130. Id. at 101-02.
131. Id. at 102.
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protection. 132
THE INCIDENCE OF DISCRIMINATORY DENIAL OF MEDICAL TREATMENT
How often is treatment denied to children because they have a disability?
According to the Commission, the answer to this question is important in
determining how the implementation of the Child Abuse Amendments could
be improved and what new measures, if any, should be administered.
133
A primary problem with determining the frequency of discrimination is
the difficulty with quantification.1 34 "When health care personnel and par-
ents agree to reject a course of life-saving medical treatment for a child with
a disability, they typically do not announce it to the world at large or report
it in those terms to statisticians or public officials."'
135
Since denial of treatment cases are rarely reported, they are usually
brought to light by a family member or health care professional.
136
"Whistleblowing" often results in serious consequences for the person who
chooses to go public with the information. Studies indicate that many peo-
ple lose their jobs, suffer retaliation, or manifest physical symptoms of de-
pression and anger. 137  The negative consequences associated with
whistleblowing, combined with the dearth of public information, suggest
that "[i]t is probable that such [reported] cases represent only the tip of the
iceberg."' 13' Therefore, the Commission examines other ways to compute
the incidence of medical discrimination. 139
First, the Commission turns to "[s]urveys of physician attitudes."'"
Based on surveys,' 4 ' the Commission concludes that "a significant propor-
tion of them [physicians] would participate in denial of treatment in certain
circumstances . . . [and] contemporary denial of treatment is not
132. Id.
133. Id. at 103.
134. Id.
135. Id. (citing Duff & Campbell, Moral and Ethical Dilemmas in the Special-Care Nurs-
ery, 289 NEw ENG. J. MED. 890 (1973)).
136. Id. at 104.
137. Id. (citing Farnsworth, Survey of Whistle Blowers Finds Retaliation But Few Regrets,
N.Y. Times, Feb. 22, 1987, at 22, cols. 1-5; Kleinfield, The Whistle Blowers' Morning After,
N.Y. Times, Nov. 9, 1986, sec. 3, at 1, col. 2).
138. Id.
139. Id. at 104-10.
140. Id. at 104-06.
141. Siperstein, Wolraich, Reed & O'Keefe, Medical Decisions and Prognostications of Pe-
diatricians for Infants with Meningomyelocele, 113 J. PEDIATRICS 835 (1988); Berseth, Kenny
& Durand, Longitudinal Development in Pediatric Residents of Attitudes Toward Neonatal Re-
suscitation, 140 AM. J. DISEASES CHILDREN 766 (1986); Kopelman, Irons & Kopelman, Ne-
onatologists Judge the "Baby Doe" Regulations, 318 NEw ENG. J. MED. 677 (1983).
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infrequent."1 42
The Commission then reviews the statement submitted by H. Rutherford
Turnbull, which documented various polls, data, and trends in ethical litera-
ture.143 Dr. Turnbull concluded that earlier dat4 supports the fact that dis-
crimination against newborns with disabilities occurred, causing needless
deaths.'" Based on more recent literature, he found considerable support
for the denial of treatment based on quality of life assessments. 145
The Commission also summarizes the investigative work of Carlton Sher-
wood,' 46 the testimony of individuals with disabilities and their families,
and recent literature.148 The Commission concludes that, in spite of imple-
mentation of the Child Abuse Amendments, "the likelihood of widespread
denials of lifesaving treatment to children with disabilities" has
continued. 149
ENFORCEMENT OF THE CHILD ABUSE AMENDMENTS OF 1984
Since federal efforts to prevent medical discrimination have been
thwarted, the responsibility for enforcing the Child Abuse Amendments
rests with state CPS agencies. 5 o The Commission's study shows that, of the
forty-eight states receiving federal funds under the Child Abuse Prevention
and Treatment Act, fourteen of these states defer to the decisions of hospital
infant care review committees or the staff when there is a case of suspected
142. MEDICAL DISCRIMINATION, supra note 2, at 104.
143. Id. at 106-07. Professor Turnbull is a professor of Special Education and Law at the
University of Kansas. His report was prepared for the Commission and is found in appendix
B, id. at 219-32.
144. Id. at 106; App. B, at 219-21.
145. Id. at 107; App. B, at 225-28.
146. Id. at 107-08. Mr. Sherwood traveled extensively and "interviewed more than 250
physicians, nurses, lawyers, hospital officials, and parents who, at one time or another, were
directly involved in Baby Doe cases... [we] reviewed upward of 700 cases where there was a
probability that infants died as a result of decisions to withdraw medical treatment." Id. at
107 (quoting Protection of Handicapped Newborns: Hearing Before the United States Commis-
sion on Civil Rights 45-46 (1986) (vol. II) (testimony of Carlton Sherwood).
147. Id. at 108-09. Dr. Rosalyn Benjamin Darling, Director, Early Intervention Services,
City Council Clinic in Johnstown, Inc., testified to comments made by physicians: "I can find
good things in practically everything, even dying, but birth defects are roaring tragedies.
Death doesn't bother me, but the living do." Another physician said, "I don't really enjoy a
really handicapped child who comes in drooling, can't walk, and so forth. Medicine is here to
perfect the human body. Something you can't do anything about challenges the doctor and
reminds him of his own inabilities." Id. at 109 (quoting Protection of Handicapped Newborns:
Hearings Before the United States Commission on Civil Rights 181 (1986) (vol. II)).
148. Id. at 109.
149. Id. at 110.
150. Id. at 111.
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treatment denial.5 1 The Commission cited the close working relationship
between CPS workers and health care professionals as one reason for the
surrender of responsibility by CPS agencies.152 According to federal regula-
tions, however, the CPS agency is responsible for the treatment determina-
tion regardless of the existence of an infant care review committee., 53 The
Commission found that CPS agencies who do not abdicate their reviewing
responsibility to committees often rely on "the same organized elements of
the medical profession who have strongly objected to the Child Abuse
Amendments."' 54
In addition, the Commission finds that "[t]here have also been a number
of indications that some state CPS agency personnel are unsympathetic to
the principles of treatment embodied in the Child Abuse Amendments."' 155
The agency personnel, mostly comprised of social workers, view these deci-
sions as more appropriately made by the physician and the parent(s). 15 6
A conflict of interest may also exist between the CPS agency and other
agencies within the state government.' 57 "CPS agencies are part of the State
government, often in the same department that runs hospitals and other in-
151. Id. at 111-12 (footnote omitted). These states include Alabama, Alaska, Arizona,
Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Maine, Michigan, Nevada, New Mexico, Washington,
and West Virginia. Id. at 112 n.4.
152. Id. at 113. CPS agencies appear to rely much more heavily on the views of the medi-
cal community than those of disability advocates. One estimate indicated that thirty-four of
thirty-seven states responding contacted members of the medical community during the
decison making process; 11 had contacted disability groups. Id. at 114 (citing interview with
Dr. Leon Burke, ISSUES L. & MED. (Nov. 30, 1987)).
153. Id. (citing 50 Fed. Red. 14,893, 14,900-14,901 (1985); 42 U.S.C. § 5103(b)(2)(B)
(1983); 45 C.F.R. § 1340.15 (c)(2)(i) (1987); 45 C.F.R. § 1340.14 (d) (1987)).
154. MEDICAL DISCRIMINATION, supra note 2, at 113. The Commission cited Kansas and
Arkansas as two examples. Kansas allows the state chapter of the American Academy of
Pediatricians to evaluate denial reports. Id. Arkansas allows the Arkansas Children's Hospi-
tal to handle such matters. Id.
Aside from the inappropriate surrender of responsibility, the Commission lists other exam-
ples of noncompliance with federal regulations. These examples include the lack of a written
policy for obtaining records (six states); the failure to provide for independent medical exami-
nations for a disabled child following the filing of a suspected neglect report (ten states); the
lack of adequate definition for the term "withholding of medically indicated treatment" (eleven
states); and lack of or inappropriate definition of the term "infant" (twenty-four states). Id. at
115. "A majority of states are not even clear in their policies concerning who is covered by the
standards of treatment in the act." Id.
155. Id. A 1987 report by the Inspector of HHS revealed that at eleven of forty-nine CPS
agencies, employees felt that their agency should not be responsible for Baby Doe cases, due to
the existence of medical and ethical issues. In addition, ten other agencies would not respond
as to where the responsibility should lie. Id. at 116 (citing U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, SURVEY OF BABY DOE PROGRAMS
11 (1987)).
156. Id. at 116-17.
157. Id. at 117.
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stitutions that provide medical treatment to children with disabilities."' ' s
As a result of this conflict, and the other factors discussed above, the Com-
mission concludes that CPS agencies have failed to "effectively enforce" the
Child Abuse Amendments.15 9
ROLE AND PERFORMANCE OF INFANT CARE REVIEW COMMITTEES
The Child Abuse Amendments of 1984 and the accompanying regulations
encourage the establishment of infant care review committees."6 Use of
these committees, in the context of "Baby Doe" cases, became more wide-
spread largely as a result of the President's Commission for the Study of
Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research re-
port entitled Deciding to Forego Life-Sustaining Treatment and the promo-
tional efforts of the American Academy of Pediatricians. 6 ' The
Commission views these discussions, as they apply to the specifics of deci-
sionmaking, as "vague" and "designed less to enforce the treatment stan-
dards of the law than to protect doctors and hospitals from 'intrusion.' "'62
The much disputed and overturned "Baby Doe" rule designed to imple-
ment section 504 contained a model for an infant care review committee. 63
This model had been the result of much debate between HHS and AAP.
Model guidelines were also included in regulations promulgated pursuant to
the passage of the Child Abuse Amendments.'" These guidelines reflected
the view of HHS that the Child Abuse Amendments "settled" ethical de-
bates regarding "what circumstances justify withholding of treatment."' 5
Thus, the HHS guidelines assumed that the particular cases that
came before a committee would not involve relitigation of the ethi-
cal and social debates about the propriety of treatment that pre-
ceded the enactment of the law, but would instead focus on an
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. The Commission defined infant care review committees as "internal hospital commit-
tees that consider instances in which life-preserving medical treatment is being or may be
withheld from infants with disabilities." Id. at 118.
161. Id. at 118-19.
162. Id. at 120. "Central to the rationale for reliance on such committees was the position,
taken by both the President's Commission and the Academy of Pediatrics, that precise sub-
stantive rules about when treatment should be provided or withheld are inappropriate." Id.
163. Id. at 121. See Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Handicap; Procedures and Guide-
lines Relating to Health Care for Handicapped Infants, 49 Fed. Reg. 1,652, 1,622 (1984).
164. MEDICAL DISCRIMINATION, supra note 2, at 121 (citing Services and Treatment for
Disabled Infants; Model Guidelines for Health Care Providers to Establish Infant Care Re-
view Committees, 50 Fed. Reg. 14,893 (1985)). These guidelines "have no mandatory force."
Id. at 122 n.34. See supra noted 89-90 and accompanying text.
165. Id. at 122.
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analysis of how the law should properly be applied to the facts of
the case.' 66
Alternatively, the model suggested by the President's Commission and the
AAP emphasized the role of bioethics and an autonomous decisionmaking
role for the committee.
With the role of these Committees at issue, the Commission investigates
the use of the infant care review committees: are they "prognosis" commit-
tees determining whether the case falls under the Child Abuse Amendments
or "ethics" committees making treatment judgments on quality of life assess-
ments? 6 7 The Commission cites instances where judgments have centered
on the perceived quality of life for the child, in direct contravention of the
Child Abuse Amendments.168 It is unclear, however, as to how often these
deliberations resulted in the denial of treatment. 169 Following from that
premise, the Commission's review of the cases involving the withholding of
treatment 70 reveals that "it is impossible to determine whether any of the
treatment denials violated the standards established by the Child Abuse
Amendments." 7 '
The Commission, reviewing the procedures of four committees, 172 a 1987
report of the HHS Inspector General, and the 1986 AAP/University of Con-
necticut survey, concludes that
the vast majority of committees convene only to deal with disagree-
ments and do not attempt to scrutinize most denial of treatment
decisions to see whether they comply with the law. This implies
that many hospital infant care review committees seem more at-
tuned to diffusing and resolving conflict in a way that keeps any
controversy as much as possible within hospital walls than to en-
suring that children with disabilities receive the lifesaving treat-





168. Id. at 123.
169. Id. at 126. Note that the Child Abuse Amendments, as interpreted by HHS, provide
an exception to the required treatment when "the treatment itself involves significant medical
contraindications and/or significant pain and suffering for the infant that clearly outweighs the
very slight potential benefit of the treatment for an infant highly unlikely to survive." Id. at
125 (quoting 45 C.F.R. § 1340, 15 app. (1987)).
170. Id. at 125-26.
171. Id. at 126.
172. Children's Hospital of Wisconsin, Albert Einstein College of Medicine-Montefiore
Medical Center, University Hospitals of Cleveland, and St. Joseph's Hospital (Denver). Id. at
122-27.
173. Id. at 127 (footnote omitted).
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The Child Abuse Amendments require known and "suspected" instances
of medical neglect to be reported to the state by designated individuals at
health care facilities. 174 This reporting requirement encompasses instances
of treatment withholding. 175
Based on the report of the HHS Inspector General, the Commission con-
cludes that most infant care review committees only report cases to the au-
thorities where no agreement regarding treatment has been reached.' 76 This
failure to report is especially serious since most committees appear to adopt
a model more closely aligned with the ideals of the AAP. 177 Furthermore,
the combination of a lack of disability group representation on the commit-
tee, the lack of specific knowledge on the part of some committee members,
and the reluctance of medical colleagues to criticize one another leads to the
question of whether the committee is able to effectively address the issues. 178
The Commission states: "[A]n institution rarely does a good job of policing
itself.... Outside oversight is needed."' 179
The Commission recognizes the permanence of review committees in the
medical setting.' 8 Based on the disagreement within the profession regard-
ing standards of treatment, however, the Commission recommends that
"there be independent, contemporaneous scrutiny of infant care review com-
mittee proceedings, preferably by medically knowledgeable and experienced
disability advocates, and that the prompt reporting requirement be more vig-
orously enforced to make this possible." 181
PERFORMANCE OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
Federal involvement in the protection of children with disabilities has
been centralized in the Child Abuse Amendments, as well as the regulations
174. Id.
175. Id.
[T]he health care facility's obligation to notify the State agency is not limited to cases
in which, for example, the infant care review committee or the responsible hospital
official makes a final determination that illegal withholding of treatment is occurring
or about to occur. Nor is it limited to cases in which the infant care review or the
responsible hospital official has attempted to convince a parent or guardian to con-
sent to legally required treatment but has failed and is turning to the civil authorities
as a last resort.
Id.
176. Id. at 128.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 128-29.
179. Id. at 129 (footnote omitted).
180. Id.
181. Id. (footnote omitted).
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promulgated under section 504 until they were struck down. '8 2 Prior to the
time that the "Baby Doe" regulations were enjoined, the HHS Office of Civil
Rights (OCR) was responsible for their enforcement. 8 3 OCR was criticized
for its failure to promptly and effectively conduct investigations. Although
OCR never officially found a violation of section 504, it warned those in
noncompliance of their shortcomings and provided them the opportunity to
remediate their practices in the future.'8 1
The Commission finds that many OCR employees viewed "Baby Doe"
investigations as an invasion of family privacy.'8 5 Significant delays were
common and the choice of medical consultants was, at times, questiona-
ble. ' 6 The Commission chronicled the Connecticut Senate investigation
into the Yale-New Haven Hospital,"8 7 the OCR investigation of Oklahoma
Children's Hospital, and subsequent OCR investigations.'
The investigation into the Oklahoma Children's Hospital has a lengthy
history."8 9 The hospital had implemented a selective treatment program for
children with spina bifida. " Within forty-eight hours of the birth of a child
with spina bifida, a hospital team evaluated the baby. Based on the severity
of the condition, the team would decide on a treatment recommendation for
the family.' 9 ' The recommendation would either be to provide "vigorous"
treatment or "supportive" care.' 92 If "supportive" care was agreed upon,
the lifesaving operation to close the spinal opening would not be performed
and no "active treatment" for infection would be given.' 93 As part of its
criteria, the team considered the family contribution "so that those families
who had greater resources might receive a recommendation for treatment
and those families with fewer resources would be more likely to receive a
recommendation against it, even though the severity of the disability might
be the same in both cases."' 194




186. Id. at 131. Dr. Gordon B. Avery and Dr. George Little, both OCR medical consul-
tants, participated in the suit to invalidate the 504 regulations by submitting affidavits on be-
half of the plaintiffs. Id. at 131 & n.10.
187. The Yale-New Haven investigation took two years to complete, but the letter of find-
ing was never issued because of the legal action challenging the 504 regulations. Id. at 135.
188. Id. at 131-35.
189. Id. at 135-38.
190. Id. at 135.
191. Id.
192. Id. (citing Gross, Cox, Tatyrek, Pollay & Barnes, Early Management and Decision
Making for the Treatment of Myelomeningocele, 72 PEDIATRICS 450 (1983)).
193. Id.
194. Id. (footnote omitted). Sixty-nine infants were included in the "experiment." Thirty-
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The publicity surrounding the Oklahoma program resulted in a complaint
to HHS and the Department of Justice.' 95 No investigation resulted. The
incident culminated in a suit filed by the American Civil Liberties Union and
the National Center for Medically Dependent and Disabled on behalf of
three of the children adversely affected by the treatment plans of several
physicians at Oklahoma Children's Hospital. 196
Regarding the lack of action on the part of the federal government in the
Connecticut and Oklahoma cases, the Commission stated:
[C]onfronted with substantial evidence of significant and ongoing
denial of lifesaving treatment to children with disabilities, evidence
that suggested an ongoing threat to lives in both States, the respon-
sible Federal agency failed to act with the vigor and dispatch in-
cumbent on it in light of the circumstances, its legal
responsibilities, and its publicly stated position.' 97
As to the federal enforcement of the Child Abuse Amendments of 1984,
the Commission views HHS' failure to find CPS agencies in noncompliance
and discontinue federal funding as "significant." '198 The Office of Inspector
General, in fulfillment of its legislative mandate, completed two studies.
One study reviewed the CPS implementation of the Child Abuse Amend-
ments and the other addressed hospital review committees. 99 According to
the Commission, these reports failed to reflect a substantive understanding
of the Child Abuse Amendments on the part of Inspector General's office,
failed to review unreported cases, and inappropriately focused on review
committees whose principles differed from those required by the law.2°°
The HHS Office of Human Development did agree to further investigate
the policies of the Federal program and eligibility of the States.2°' While the
Commission notes this fact in its conclusion, it expresses serious concern for
the "extremely poor performance" of HHS.2°2
six were recommended to receive "vigorous" treatment. All but one (who was killed in a car
accident) survived. Thirty-three children were recommended for "supportive care." Five fam-
ilies rejected this recommendation and received "vigorous" treatment. Three of these children
survived. Of the twenty-four children receiving only "supportive care," all died. Id.
195. Id. at 136-38.
196. Id. at 138; Johnson v. Sullivan, No. CIV-85-2434A (W.D. Okla. filed Oct. 3, 1985).
See infra notes 265-68 and accompanying text.
197. Id. at 139.
198. Id.
199. Id. (citing U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR
GENERAL, SURVEY OF BABY DOE PROGRAMS (1987); U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVICES, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, INFANT CARE REVIEW COMMITTEES UNDER
THE BABY DOE PROGRAM (1987)).
200. MEDICAL DISCRIMINATION, supra note 2, at 139-40.
201. Id. at 141.
202. Id.
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THE PROTECTION AND ADVOCACY SYSTEM: A RESOURCE FOR
ENFORCEMENT
Protection and Advocacy Systems (P & A) were established by Congress
in 1975203 to "ensure vigorous advocacy of the rights of persons with devel-
opmental disabilities. ' , 2° 4 The P & A staff is comprised of lawyers, social
workers, and advocates.2 "5 While the P & A system has handled cases of
discriminatory denial of treatment to people with disabilities in the past, the
major responsibility for enforcement has rested with the CPS agencies.20 6
The Commission believes that the P & A system should play a larger role
in the prevention of discrimination against children with disabilities. 20 7 It
views the added involvement of the P & A as having several advantages.
The P & A system is more skilled in handling cases involving the rights of
those with disabilities.20 8 In addition, there is less potential for conflicts of
interest since the special relationship found between the CPS agency and the
medical profession does not exist between the P & A system and the medical
profession. 2° Finally, "P & A agencies are accountable to the populations
they serve."
2 10
The Commission maintains that "certain tools are essential" in utilizing P
& A systems.2 1I First, the State P & A should be notified when the State
CPS agency receives a report that discriminatory denial may have oc-
203. 42 U.S.C.A. § 6001 (Supp. 1988).
204. MEDICAL DISCRIMINATION, supra note 2, at 142.
205. Id. at 143. Their activities consist of:
(1) investigating, negotiating or mediating solutions to problems expressed by per-
sons with developmental disabilities, persons with mental illness or clients of DVRs
[departments of vocational rehabilitation], their families or agency representatives;
(2) providing technical assistance to attorneys, government agencies and service
providers; (3) providing legal counsel and litigation services to persons in this popula-
tion and groups who are unable to attain adequate or appropriate legal services in
their communities; and (4) training advocates, consumers, volunteers, professionals,
and other parties.
Id. (quoting NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF PROTECTION AND ADVOCACY SYSTEMS, 1987 STA-
TISTICAL REPORT 3 (1988)).
206. Id.
207. Id. Among its powers, the P & A system would "have independent standing to initi-
ate a court proceeding to authorize medical treatment for the child,... [and] appear on behalf
of the child in any court proceeding to authorize medical treatment initiated by the CPS
agency." Id. In addition, the P & A "could obtain a court order for an independent medical
examination" and "conduct retrospective reviews of the medical records of those with disabili-
ties who die in the State." Id. at 143-44.
208. Id. at 144.
209. Id.
210. Id. The P & A agencies must allow public comment on their goals and provide for a
grievance mechanism. Id.
211. Id. at 145.
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curred.21 2 The P & A must have access to medical records upon receipt of
such a report.2t 3 In addition, "new mechanisms" for reporting are neces-
sary.21 4 The P & A agency should be allowed to review medical records and
meet with the physicians, relatives, and committees involved. 215 The access
to records should be retrospective to include those records of children who
have died.2 16 In order to achieve these additional responsibilities, the Com-
mission endorses more funding for the P & A system.217
POLITICAL VIEWPOINTS
The Dissenting View of Chairman Allen
The Commission's report, however, did not go uncriticized. Chairman
William B. Allen dissented.218 Several of his concerns center on method-
ological flaws: "research incontinence," "the failure to make as strong a
demonstration as possible," and "the steadfast refusal to vent the report
among critics in advance.
2 19
Chairman Allen presents substantive concerns as well as methodological




215. Id. at 146.
216. Id.
Requiring notification to the P & A whenever an infant care review committee con-
venes to consider a "live" case, standing alone, will probably ameliorate the wide-
spread failure to report by health care facilities, but it is unlikely to cure it .... [I]f
there were no retrospective access, [the effect] might be to drive underground con-
templated withholding of treatment, as physicians seeking to avoid outside review
might simply cease to use the formal hospital committees. A knowledge that all
deaths of children with disabilities will at least potentially be subject to retrospective
review will significantly reduce that incentive.
Id.
217. Id. at 146-47.
218. Id. at 154-57. Chairman Allen stated:
I did not vote against the report, but neither did I vote to approve. Indeed, I spoke
expressly in criticism of it.... The point, of course, is that in the face of tremendous
pressure, I do not palliate the significance of my vote by hiding behind technicalities.
Rather, I candidly own that I voted not to approve, and would do so again on the
record established.
Id. at 154 n.l.
219. Id. Chairman Allen appeared the most disturbed by the failure of the Commission to
allow circulation of the draft report for confidential comment: "The interest of producing the
strongest possible counterargument is to enhance the credibility of the final document. ...
Even when such an approach will not guarantee that we persuade others, it will guarantee that
we will earn their respect." Id. (footnote omitted).
220. Id. at 155-57. He perceives the report as presenting "the question as one about thresh-
olds for humanity, as if protoplasm quickened into humanity on some measurable scale to
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cratic Oath in its guarantee of "the right to life to persons." '2 2 1 In spite of
their rejection of the Hippocratic oath,2 22 physicians remain bound by con-
stitutional standards.22 3
What we are trying to do now is to measure whether and how the
protections of law can make up for the loss of steady moral com-
mitment ... By presenting the plight of the handicapped newborn
as the logical development of unbroken historical antecedents -
the legacy of bigotry in America! - instead of as a corruption of
previous accomplishments, it depreciates not only the value of the
Hippocratic standard but also the organic principles of our
nation. 22
4
While agreeing with a condemnation of the eugenicist movement, Chair-
man Allen maintains that it is "nevertheless unsound to seek to derive the
eugenicist movement from mere historical conditions or the cultural mi-
lieu."'221 Looking to "the heart of the report," Chairman Allen disagrees
with the assumption of rights as "defined" or "illustrated" by needs.22 6
Chairman Allen concludes in his dissent by stating:
We have abiding confidence that a regime of equal rights is the
surest relief for unmerited disadvantage. We reject the contention,
however, that to relieve disadvantages is to guarantee equality of
rights. Insofar as this report takes the opposite position on this
crucial question, we should not approve it. The correct application
of this principle to the handicapped is to assure that they suffer no
further burdens (above all civil burdens) than are already intrinsic
to their circumstances.22 7
He stated his position more clearly, however, in a footnote:
[C]ivil rights guarantees the fair distribution not only of advan-
tages, but also of burdens. Hence, so long as medical neglect may
fairly affect any citizen, without regard to handicap, race, gender,
or other prohibited grounds, it could not pose a civil rights prob-
lem. Thus the task of this report has been to prove not only that
which our art or science point us." Id. at 155. Society views knowledge of humanity as depen-
dent on knowledge of the arts, in direct contravention of Hippocrates' views, regardless of
their viewpoint on the Baby Doe issue. Id. at 155-56.
221. Id. at 156.
222. Allen stresses that "today ...physicians no longer subscribe to Hippocratic stan-
dards, and certainly not to the Hippocratic Oath." Rather, medicine has adopted the "Princi-
ples of Medical Ethics" which drop the opposition to abortion and suicide found in the
Hippocratic Oath. Id. at 156.
223. Id.
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the handicapped newborn is burdened, but unfairly so. That the
report fails to establish even the threshold phenomenon in the post-
1984 environment is a signal [sic] condemnation of the effort de-
voted to it and the taxpayer funds expended on it.2 28
Dr. H. Tristam Engelhardt submitted comments in support of Chairman
Allen's position. As one of the foremost experts in medical ethics, Dr. En-
gelhardt states: "The report does not appreciate that a major shift in atti-
tude has taken place, which makes further Infant Doe cases such as that in
Bloomington, Indiana, highly unlikely, but which has made child abuse
through overtreatment more likely."' 229 He maintains that there has been no
evidence of significant undertreatment of disabled infants since 1985.230
Dr. Engelhardt's presentation can best be summarized by his three "max-
ims." First, "avoid seduction by the therapeutic and technological impera-
tives., 231  The growth of technology leads to unrealistic expectations of
medical treatment.23 2 Physicians and hospitals gain profits and notoriety
from technological advancement and "their roles as heroic therapists., 233
According to Dr. Engelhardt, however, these are not sufficient justifications
for treatment that may only offer "some benefit of preserving life."
234
The second maxim is to "encourage responsible choices on the part of
individuals and avoid the intervention of government bureaucracies, when-
ever possible, in individual life-and-death choices., 235 Dr. Engelhardt fore-
sees new regulations as leading to "a bureaucratization of medical
technology., 236 Instead of further bureaucratization, the family should play
the central role in these decisions. 237
Finally, Dr. Engelhardt's third maxim encourages society to "recognize
that a treatment that has a chance of saving life may be appropriately de-
clined, if the harms are likely to outweigh the benefits. ' 231 Parents should
not be restricted in their decisions regarding such treatment: "There should
be no obligation to provide inhumane treatment. ,239
228. Id. at 156 n.6.
229. Id. at 158.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 165.
232. Id. at 159.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 165. "The actual pain and suffering involved in a treatment must be taken into
consideration when deciding what treatment, if any, is indicated for individuals who have a
good chance of dying." Id.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 162-63.
238. Id. at 165.
239. Id.
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Commissioner Destro's Response
Commissioner Robert Destro, the major force behind this report, stressed
in his statement "the practical and political issues the Commission had to
overcome in the course of its deliberations, and to suggest a wider context in
which this report and its recommendations should be viewed." 2" The major
problem, both conceptual and political, was to identify which issues were
within antidiscrimination and neglect laws, which issues were governed by
medical decisions or ethics, and which issues required parental choice.24" '
According to Commissioner Destro, "neither child abuse and neglect nor
discrimination on the basis of disability are 'private' matters."242 Therefore,
the question addressed by the report is: "whether medically indicated (i.e.
necessary) treatment for a given condition becomes any less 'necessary' when
the patient has a disability?' 243
Commissioner Destro likens the placement of the question in the hands of
medical ethics to the shift in attitude of physicians in Nazi Germany. 2" The
attitude started with an acceptance of quality of life assessments for the "sev-
erally and chronically sick" and escalated to include "the socially unproduc-
tive, the ideologically unwanted, the racially unwanted and finally all non-
Germans." '245 According to Commissioner Destro, the same "subtle shift in
attitude" has started.246
Commissioner Destro, in an effort to rebut Chairman Allen, points to sev-
eral reasons why the actual numbers of treatment denial cases are hard to
calculate and can only be effectively obtained after the treatment is de-
nied.247 First of all, governmental efforts to require the posting of informa-
tion notices encouraging reporting have been struck down in the courts.248
The reporting of treatment denial cases by employees has led to disciplinary
actions and firings. 249 Finally, the HHS Office of Civil Rights opposed in-
vestigations and the Civil Rights Division of the Justice Department slowed
investigations after the Bowen v. American Hospital Association case.25°
Commissioner Destro claims that the number of cases, is "almost beside




244. Id. at 208.
245. Id. at 208 (quoting Alexander, Medical Science Under Dictatorship, 241 NEw ENG. J.
MED. 39, 41 & n.17 (1949)).
246. Id.
247. Id. at 208-09.
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the point" because of two other problems.25'
First, the boldness with which the discrimination is reported con-
veys the attitude that those involved see no problem with their be-
havior. Second, and more relevant to the Commission's task, the
fact that courts have, on occasion and on the face of great public
scrutiny, authorized medical neglect of persons with disabilities
means that discriminatory attitudes about the "quality" of their
lives are shared by those whose obligation it is to enforce our civil
rights laws.2 52
Commissioner Destro rejects any suggestion that these cases be "privatized"
or "medicalized."
In addition, Commissioner Destro discusses and rejects the opposing view
that the report's conclusion centers on "overtreatment. ' ' 2" He maintains
instead that the report's context belongs in a realm where "discrimination
based on non-medical factors is occurring. ' 254 The "quality of life" stan-
dard is viewed as a "formula" to place a "scientific patina" on medical
discrimination.255
Commissioner Destro describes the "most interesting, and personally frus-
trating" element of the Commission's work.256 During the first hearing, dis-
crimination issues were virtually ignored: "bioethics, medicine, and personal
privacy" emerged on the forefront.2 57 In the second hearing, "balance" was
struck with an emphasis on "disability and jrehabilitation issues. '25 He
notes, however:
But then, libertarians on the Commission's staff took over. Firm
believers in deregulation, they sat on the transcript of the 1986
hearing, refusing to release it even to this Commissioner, for nearly
a full year. Considerable political capital was expended in an at-
tempt to kill the report as late as August 1987. In short, the inter-
nal opposition of key staff members to the publication of this report
largely accounts for its late release. For some, personal liberty was
the motivating reason for their opposition; for others, it was the
251. Id. at 209.
252. Id.
253. Id.
Overtreatment was never the focus of this study . . . The focus is - and should
always remain - on the legitimacy of individual and collective decision-making. If
the decision is a legitimate medical one, it is not for the law to second-guess. If it is




256. Id. at 211.
257. Id.
258. Id.
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"abortion connection" which complicated an objective review of
the record. Sadly, neither group ever stopped to consider whether
there might really be discimination going on.259
Commissioner Destro recognized a connection between the "Baby Doe"
issue and abortion, not as political, but as "philosophical and moral.
' 2 1
Acknowledging the limitations of the law, Commissioner Destro concludes
that the report "rejects" discrimination.26" '
Public Reaction
The Commission's report drew predictable responses. A Justice Depart-
ment spokesman defended the government's position: "We've had an ag-
gressive record on intervening on behalf of handicapped infants. We took a
lot of heat for intervening in the Stony Brook [Baby Jane Doe] case."'262 Dr.
James Strain, executive director of the American Academy of Pediatrics,
maintained that the states and hospital ethics committees were fulfilling their
responsibility to ensure the care of newborns; therefore, no federal interven-
tion was needed. 263
In defense of the report, Reed Martin, of the National Task Force on
Integrated Special Education, stated that the report supplies the facts the
Supreme Court declared missing in Bowen.264 Other groups supporting the
Commission's efforts included the Pratt Monitoring Group of the District of
Columbia Association for Retarded Citizens, The Disability Institute, and
Sick Kids Need Involved People (SKIP).
CONCLUSION
The issue of treatment withholding has reemerged. A jury trial in the
Western District of Oklahoma recently resulted in a verdict for several doc-
tors affiliated with the Oklahoma Children's Hospital.265  The case was
brought on behalf of three children born with spina bifida. One child, Carl-
ton Johnson, was left untreated for thirteen months and has survived.266
The other two, left untreated, died. 267 The case is on appeal to the Tenth
259. Id.
260. Id. at 212.
261. Id.
262. Kerr, New U.S. 'Baby Doe' Report: Civil Rights Panel Seeks More Monitoring of Hand-
icapped Newborns, Newsday, Nov. 17, 1988, at 3.
263. Id.
264. Civil Rights Commission Reviews 'Baby Doe' Report, PR Newswire, Nov. 23, 1988.
265. Johnson v. Sullivan, No. CIV-85-2434A (W.D. Okla. judgment entered Feb. 8, 1990).
266. Price, Doctors Cleared in Spina Bifida Babies' Death, Wash. Times, Feb. 6, 1990, at
A5.
267. Id. One of the children, Stonewall Jackson Smith, was born without a brain. The
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Circuit. 26
8
The fruit of the Commission's labor may be seen in the Johnson appeal.
Certainly, the Commission's report provides a wealth of information for
those concerned about the cases of Carlton Johnson and "Baby Doe." What
effect, if any, the report will have in a courtroom remains to be seen.
More predictable is the effect of the report on the medical community.
From the evidence gathered in the Commission's report, it is clear that many
in the medical community strongly disagree with the Commission's recom-
mendations. A formidable army exists, poised to block any intervention into
the decisionmaking process.
Although strongly opposed to the structure of the overturned Baby Doe
regulations, Canadian commentators succinctly enunciated the existence of
ethical dilemmas. "Certain practices ... cry out for comment and analysis
from both legal and ethical points of view.... Broad categories of questiona-
ble intensive care practice need to be synthesized from the individual cases.
It is those categories of questionable medical practice which require legal
and ethical analysis; not individual cases of abuse."' 269 While it appears clear
that regulations aimed at the identification of individual cases of abuse may
continue to be criticized and overturned, the Commission's report should




judge dismissed the claims against the doctors on the premise that the child would have died
anyway. Id.
268. Johnson v. Gross, No. 90-6107 (10th Cir. filed Mar. 8, 1990).
269. WITHHOLDING TREATMENT, supra note 32, at 37.
